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China and India are the rising powers of Asia. However, elements of competition are evident 
in their strategic intentions, and much of this competition seems likely to be played out in the 
maritime domain, particularly in Southeast Asian waters. Hitherto China and India have 
operated in their exclusive spheres of interest – India in the Indian Ocean and China in the 
East Asian seas, but this will change. China is extending its operations into the Indian Ocean, 
and India into the East Asian seas. How this overlap of strategic interests will develop is a 
vital question for the Indo-Pacific region generally, and for Southeast Asia in particular. 
 
A possible “turf war” between China and India, played out largely in Southeast Asia, has 
been described as “a sobering aspect of Asia’s international relations”.1 India is attaching 
importance to its “Look East” policies that include naval cooperation with Southeast Asian 
countries. The Indian Navy has deployed naval units to the Pacific Ocean in recent years for 
port visits and exercises with East Asian navies and the USN, but at the same time, India is 
concerned about the Chinese Navy entering the Indian Ocean. This move is often viewed as a 
demonstration of China’s so-called “String of Pearls” strategy,2 although there are doubts as 
to whether this strategy actually exists.3  
 
There is asymmetry in the way that China and India regard each other.  A basic feature is that 
while India clearly sees China as a threat to its strategic interests, particularly in the Indian 
Ocean, China does not necessarily see India as a strategic rival. Chinese concerns about India 
only arise when India appears to be acting in concert with Japan and the United States in 
moves that it considers are possibly directed at its strategic containment. 
 
Other questions are apparent about the strategic intentions of the two powers. What are 
India’s strategic interests in the South China Sea? Are they equivalent to China’s interests in 
the Indian Ocean?  Chinese strategic interests in energy security and the security of its supply 
lines from the Middle East across the Indian Ocean are to some extent understandable, but 
India’s interests in the Pacific Ocean are not as clear. They have some historical rectitude, but 
it also appears that India, aided and abetted by the United States,4 has presumed for itself a 
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stabilising and balancing role, as a counter to China, in the region. For India to discharge this 
role, it must move out of its comfort zone in the Indian Ocean and into the Western Pacific.5 
There is also the presumption that in the longer term, the influence of the United States in 
East Asia will decline, and India in concert with Japan, must provide the balance to 
burgeoning Chinese influence. 
 
While the United States has long underwritten the security of Asia, there are doubts about 
how long this will continue.6 The expansion of new powers and questions about the future 
trajectory of the United States and its relationships with these new powers has created 
uncertainty in the region. In the present and near term, India is developing as a strategic 
partner of the United States, particularly with growing naval cooperation, but China continues 
to be identified by American commentators as a potential adversary. 
 
China clearly feels threatened by the closer relations between India and the United States. As 
Bronson Percival has noted in his paper, the Sino-U.S. relationship is inherently complex and 
a challenge for both countries.7 This latter trend is reinforced by increasingly more regular 
stand-offs between American and Chinese naval assets in the seas of East Asia. Relevant 
incidents include the clash between the ocean surveillance ship, USNS Impeccable, and 
Chinese vessels in March 2009,8 and the damage to the sonar array towed by the destroyer 
USS McCain caused by a Chinese submarine in June 2009.9 
 
The expansion of China’s navy and maritime influence more generally poses challenges for 
Southeast Asian countries, as well as for other countries of the Asia-Pacific region. It is 
difficult to escape a conclusion that China is driving the substantial arms build-up in the 
region both directly and indirectly; directly by creating a “security dilemma” for some 
countries, and indirectly by creating an atmosphere of regional insecurity due to uncertainty 
over China’s intentions. 
 
A difficult conundrum would arise for Southeast Asian countries if they were forced to take 
sides between China on the one hand and India, perhaps in concert with Japan and the United 
States, on the other. Despite India’s assumed role of balancing China, there is no certainty 
that Southeast Asian countries desire this, or indeed would be prepared to support India in 
any dispute with China. As Evelyn Goh has noted in an important article, China’s “charm 
offensive” has been successful, and “East Asian states may be more comfortable with 
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deferring to a strong China than others might think”.10 Either way, the strategic risks of 
competition between China and India are high and the Southeast Asians would wish to avoid 
at all costs having to make such a choice. They prefer a broader, multi-dimensional strategy 
that involves closer economic relations, dialogue, cooperation and military exchanges with all 
the major regional players, including China and India.11 
 
A major development since the conference in November 2008 has been the rapid 
improvement of cross-Strait relations between China and Taiwan. The region may soon have 
to come to terms with the combined maritime strength of China and Taiwan. A resolution of 
Taiwan’s status within the Chinese political state would constitute “a geopolitically 
momentous tectonic shift in the Western Pacific”12 with a particularly powerful impact in the 
maritime realm. While Taiwan’s navy is not particularly strong, Taiwan has a strong Coast 
Guard and many of the other attributes of maritime power, notably large shipping and fishing 
fleets, a heavy involvement in international seaborne trade, great shipbuilding capacity, and 
broad maritime zones stretching out into the Pacific Ocean. The political merger of China and 
Taiwan would significantly strengthen China’s position in the South China Sea, particularly 
because China would then have access to Itu Aba, which is the largest island in the area with 
an airstrip and currently occupied by Taiwan. 
 
Implications for Southeast Asia 
China’s and India’s strategic interests overlap in Southeast Asia. Maritime strategic 
competition, or even conflict in a worst case scenario, between the two countries would take 
place largely in regional waters, where Southeast Asian countries have vital economic and 
strategic interests. However, both India and China have claims to being Southeast Asian 
countries in their own right; India by virtue of the geographic location of the Andaman and 
Nicobar Islands,13 and China because it is a littoral state to the South China Sea where it has 
prominent sovereignty claims. 
 
Southeast Asia sits astride major shipping routes between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. 
These routes are vital both economically, particularly to the countries of Northeast Asia who 
depend upon them for energy supplies from the Middle East; and strategically, particularly 
for the United States as the sole global super sea power and increasingly for the rapidly 
growing regional sea powers, China and India. Southeast Asia is the confluence of the 
strategic interests of China and India. Maritime safety and security in the region are vital 
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interests for both countries, and both will increasingly seek a more active role in their 
provision. 
 
Developments with the Chinese and Indian navies are of particular interest to Southeast 
Asian countries as these navies are both likely to increase their naval deployments into and 
through the region in the future. The increased presence of the Chinese and Indian navies in 
regional waters will add to that of the other extra-regional navies, mainly the United States 
and Australian navies, which have long had a presence there. At this stage, the Japanese navy 
has constitutional restrictions on deploying overseas, and the Korean navy has shown little 
interest in operating much beyond its home waters. 
 
Myanmar is one Southeast Asia country that is particularly affected by competition between 
China and India. India regards building a close relationship with Myanmar as having great 
strategic importance.14 Myanmar is the only Southeast Asian country that has land and 
maritime boundaries with India. Hence India has concerns about the political regime in 
Myanmar and China’s strategic moves into the country. The competitive interests of China 
and India in Myanmar have been evident lately with their increased awareness of the 
hydrocarbon potential of the waters off Myanmar.15 
 
There is a contrast in the approaches of the two countries to building maritime security 
relationships with Southeast Asian countries. China tends to use “soft power” and has so far 
made little use of naval forces in promoting cooperation and dialogue. In responding to 
developments adverse to Chinese interests in the South China Sea, it has deployed additional 
coast guard forces rather than naval forces.16 There is increased Chinese preparedness to enter 
into maritime cooperative activities, including with energy cooperation in disputed areas of 
the South China Sea.17  India, on the other hand, has shown a preference for “hard power” 
strongly promoting naval cooperation in the region with the active involvement of Indian 
Navy units in joint patrols and exercises with Southeast Asian navies.  
 
These strategic developments and their implications for Southeast Asia pose more questions 
than answers. Some of the key questions are: While the strategic interests of China and India 
overlap in Southeast Asia, will this necessarily lead to tension and conflict? To what extent 
should Southeast Asian countries be concerned about the rising maritime power of China and 
India? What are the common interests of these countries, as well as other countries in the 
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region, that might lead to some trust and understanding as the basis for a more stable regional 
maritime security environment? Does the rise of China and India offer security to Southeast 
Asia? Can they be security providers and builders of alliances in the same way as the United 
States has done over the years? Do current regional arrangements and institutions provide an 
adequate basis for the building of this trust and confidence? 
 
The chapters in this book go some way to answering these questions, but with rather less than 
full confidence about the answers provided. Particular attention needs to be given to naval 
developments in the region not just with the Chinese and Indian navies but also with other 
regional navies and the navies that deploy assets into the region. Submarine proliferation is a 
development that exhibits some of the characteristics of a naval arms race. The situation is a 
very dynamic one and as has been evident, even in 2009 to date, it can change quite rapidly. 
 
Strategic Containment 
There has been a lot of talk in recent years about strategic containment. India feels that with 
its territorial disputes with China in its northern land border areas, and its perception of a 
Chinese “String of Pearls” strategy in the Indian Ocean, that it is being locked in by China. 
Conversely, China feels that it is itself being strategically contained, particularly in the 
maritime domain, by the growing links between India, Japan and the United States. As Rory 
Medcalf observes, Australia has drawn back from participation in naval exercises with these 
three countries for fear of feeding the mythology of a China containment strategy.18 
 
Several of the Japanese and Indian chapters in this work add fuel to the concept of India and 
Japan balancing China’s naval expansion and providing possible strategic containment of 
China. As Tetsuo Kotani points out, China’s growing maritime ambitions raise grave 
concerns for Japan’s sea lane security.19 In October 2008, Tokyo and New Delhi made a joint 
security announcement to further bilateral security cooperation.20 Such a security strategy is 
regarded by the two countries as counter-balancing the Chinese “String of Pearls” strategy. 
 
Mike McDevitt expresses concern that China is now intruding into a maritime region that has 
been the preserve of the United States and its allies for many decades.21 He believes it was an 
implied mission of U.S. forces not to let China’s military power to coerce Asian nations into 
agreements that they would not be otherwise have been willing to accept. He is concerned 
about a developing perception that China was gaining the ability to trump American presence 
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in the region if it chooses to. China aims to have the ability to deny the United States military 
access to the region so that the United States could not interfere with a PLA use of force to 
resolve many of its outstanding maritime strategic issues. However, problems will emerge if 
the United States tries too strenuously to compete with China. 
 
In many ways, these conflicting perceptions of containment and the need for balancing are 
the root cause of strategic uncertainty in the region, and the tension that is most evident 
between China and India. They are not helped by some lack of transparency in the strategic 
intentions of the two countries. As the 2009 Australian Defence White Paper points out, there 
is a developing picture of strategic uncertainty with the primacy of the United States 
increasingly being tested, changed power relations and the possibility of confrontation in the 
longer term between major powers of the region – the United States, China, India, Japan and 
Russia.22 It believes that it would be premature to judge that war among states, including the 
major powers, has been eliminated as a feature of the international system.23 In noting that 
shows of force by rising powers could become more common as their military capabilities 
expand,24 the Australian White Paper could have India in its sights almost as much as China. 
 
Naval Developments 
Much of the additional defence spending in the region has gone towards naval capabilities: 
ships, submarines and aircraft. It should be of concern to Southeast Asian countries that in the 
future, there will be more ships, submarines and maritime aircraft operating in relatively 
confined regional waters, some areas of which include sovereignty disputes and unresolved 
maritime boundaries. Increased military activity at sea increases the risks of an unfortunate 
incident between naval forces. The management of these risks requires a fresh look at 
preventive diplomacy and confidence building in the maritime domain. There is a need for 
contingency plans for managing a naval crisis, such as the detection of an “intruder” 
submarine in waters under the sovereignty of a coastal state, or a naval stand-off in an area of 
disputed sovereignty. However, as Kwa Chong Guan notes, despite the desirability of 
Avoidance of Incidents at Sea (INCESA) agreements or similar arrangements, establishing 
them to cover current circumstances in Southeast Asia will be difficult.25 
 
A key question for the regional naval balance is whether we are seeing the emergence of 
cooperative or competitive naval strategies. The high level of naval exercising, as well as the 
efforts by the United States to build naval coalitions of friendly nations primarily to combat 
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the threat of terrorism, would suggest cooperative strategies, but other developments point to 
a degree of competition. Submarines, in particular, are a non-cooperative and highly 
competitive weapon system. While most navies, including the Chinese Navy, stress that their 
capabilities are being developed for defensive purposes, it is very difficult, as Norman 
Friedman observes, to differentiate offensive from defensive capabilities.26 
 
The trends for the future with naval capabilities will probably be more of the same. We are 
likely to see growing fleets of major surface combatants and submarines. Anti-ship missile 
capabilities and maritime patrol aircraft are possible capability “gaps” to be filled in the 
future. The proliferation of submarines in the region will lead to greater attention being given 
to anti-submarine warfare (ASW), as well as increased oceanographic surveying to provide 
data for safe submarine operations and ASW. 
 
China 
China has been increasing its defence budget in recent years by up to 20 per cent per annum, 27 
and has recently become the second biggest defence spender in the world after the United 
States.28 In relative terms, the PLA-N has been the main beneficiary of increased defence budget 
allocations. China is now proceeding to acquire an aircraft carrier capability. This would accord 
with China’s aspirations to become a major regional blue-water sea power. The naval planners 
in Beijing justify these developments on the basis of China’s extensive and growing maritime 
interests, including the lingering problem of Taiwan and the sovereignty claims in the South 
China Sea, and increasing dependence on energy imports. 
 
While global and regional “flag waving” deployments of Chinese naval vessels have increased 
in recent years, China has so far not used its naval forces in any overt way to promote Chinese 
naval power and influence in Southeast Asia. The plans to build a nuclear submarine base in 
Hainan promoted a strong reaction from India but Southeast Asian countries seem more relaxed 
about this development. As Li Minjiang notes in his chapter, many analysts who focus on the 
growth of China’s naval power tend to develop negative views, predicting that its growing naval 
power will destabilize the region in the future.29 He argues that it was possible to arrive at a 
more balanced and arguably more accurate understanding of China’s maritime strategy and 
policy. He notes that some of the biggest obstacles to China- U.S. military exchanges include 
American perceptions of the “Chinese military threat”, as well as the Chinese belief that the 
United States intends to foster the strategic encirclement of China. There remains insufficient 
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strategic trust between China and other major powers in East Asia, particularly Japan and India, 
although as has been noted, Southeast Asian countries may be more accommodating. 
 
Japan 
Japan is the one regional maritime power whose actions are not open to criticism with regard 
to its involvement in the Southeast Asian maritime domain. Its naval vessels occasionally 
pass through the region en route to the Middle East, but any deployments to the region itself 
are by units of the Japan Coast Guard providing capacity-building assistance to regional 
maritime security agencies.30 Japan’s defence spending has not increased over recent years, 
and it has also dedicated much effort to cooperate and assist Southeast Asian countries in 
enhancing the safety and security of sea lines of communication (SLOCs) in the region. 
 
India 
India has long had the most powerful regional navy in the Indian Ocean, but is now seeking 
to extend its maritime influence eastwards. India’s role in the region has been boosted by the 
developing strategic relationship with the United States that includes a strong naval 
dimension. Regular exercises are taking place between the U.S. Navy and the Indian Navy 
including in the Western Pacific. India has been very proactive with naval diplomacy in 
recent years, including with naval ship visits to ports in East Asia, participating with the USN 
in exercises in the Pacific and in hosting the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS).31 India 
also has a large Coast Guard that has primary responsibility for policing in the EEZ. India 
could follow Japan’s example and use the coast guard as an instrument of “soft power” to 
engage in maritime cooperation in Southeast Asia, but so far has chosen not to. 
 
While China and India will both have nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers in the future, 
they are both currently lacking in capabilities to sustain “blue water” naval power away from 
their home bases. Norman Friedman in his chapter explains the importance of endurance or 
sustainability in naval operations.32 Without, aircraft carriers or underway support ships, 
warships cannot be replenished with fuel, ammunition and other stores. Bases in foreign 
countries are a poor substitute for underway support due to uncertainties of access and 
difficulties in maintaining adequate supplies of specialised needs, such as spare arts and 
ammunition. These will all be major problems for China and India as China contemplates 
operations in the Indian Ocean and India in the Pacific. These deficiencies are appreciated in 
China with the naval commander-in-chief stating in April 2009 that “the navy will greatly 
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strengthen its logistics and support facility system to improve far-sea repair, delivery, rescue 
and replenishment capacities”.33 The Indian Navy currently has three fleet replenishment 
ships in service while China has about twice that number. 
 
A naval arms race in the region? 
There is increasing debate about whether there is a naval arms race in the region. On the hand, 
people argue that the growth in regional navies and naval activities is part of a process of 
modernization and the doctrinal shift from internal security to maritime security. However, in 
many ways, the naval build-up goes beyond modernization with navies adding significant new 
capabilities they did not possess previously.34 This change has been in the pipeline over two 
decades or more ever since regional countries started experiencing strong economic growth, 
along with increased awareness of the need for capabilities to protect maritime interests, such as 
offshore sovereignty, resources and shipping routes. 
 
On the other hand, there are arguments that a naval arms race in developing in the region with 
China often being seen as the trigger for the race. China’s naval force expansion plans may be an 
explanation for the acquisition of new missile destroyers in South Korea and Japan.35 China’s 
submarine basis on Hainan may well have spurred an “arms race” type reaction from India.36 
 
Cooperation and Confidence Building 
Several chapters in this book suggest that the necessary trust and understanding, which would 
provide a basis for a more stable regional maritime security environment, is currently lacking. 
As Park Chang Kwoun points out, maritime security in region shows a mixture of cooperation 
and aggression.37 Parties to opposing territorial claims might agree on peaceful settlement of the 
dispute, including possibly going as far as negotiating some form of joint development, but they 
firmly maintain and assert their sovereignty over offshore islets. Such maritime disputes remain 
the greatest barrier to the development of effective maritime security cooperation in the region. 
 
The naval buildup in the region increases the uncertainty of maritime security.38 Without trust 
and transparency, this environment can lead to the classic “security dilemma” with a steady 
and progressive trend towards stronger naval forces. There is an increasingly urgent need for 
measures to enhance the transparency of naval plans and build mutual trust. At the Shangri-
La Dialogue in 2009, Singapore’s Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Teo Chee 
Hean called for greater transparency about military armaments to help avoid 
10 
 
misunderstandings and increase trust and confidence in the region, but went to note that this 
transparency must go beyond being open about military acquisitions to include declarations 
of strategic intent and security concerns.39 
 
Rear Admiral Chauhan points out in his chapter that maritime security challenges in the 
region can only be met through a regionally inclusive process of cooperative security.40 This 
is the approach of the Indian Navy that views constructive engagement as the primary means 
of achieving and assuring mutually beneficial maritime security, stability, safety and 
consequent collective economic prosperity. There is little true maritime security cooperation 
in the region at present, except in the Malacca and Singapore straits, but even that has 
limitations. The bilateral sensitivities between regional navies remain strong. The so-called 
joint patrols are largely for “show”, and are too occasional and limited in nature, to be 
regarded as en effective contribution to regional maritime security although clearly they do 
help with confidence and trust building. 
 
India-China maritime cooperation is a positive development that may help to dampen down 
the risks of conflict at sea. Both countries have clear common interests in maritime security, 
that could support cooperative endeavours, but unfortunately power politics appear to get in 
the way of genuine cooperation. Mutual trust is very hard to develop. 
 
Looking to the Future 
While the strategic aspirations of China and India overlap in Southeast Asia, there might be 
adequate space for both maritime powers to grow simultaneously with sufficient tasks and 
interests to provide a basis for cooperation and dialogue. This will be assisted by the 
indications that Southeast Asian countries are prepared to adopt an even-handed approach 
between the two increasingly more powerful players in the region. Thus in answer to the first 
two questions posed by Admiral Arun Prakash in his introduction to this book, it does not 
have to be a zero sum game in which one country gains advantage to the disadvantage of the 
other, and despite the overlap in aspirations, it should be possible to prevent the situation 
from becoming a conflict.41 Nevertheless in answer to his third question, Southeast Asians 
still have cause for concern about the potential for their region to become the focus of the 




There is much debate in the region at present about regional security architecture that would 
provide a political framework for addressing the difficult issues raised in this book. However, 
little progress has been made with reaching agreement. As Raja Mohan observes in his 
chapter, even the process of institution building is subject to power politics.42 
 
Effective institutions for managing regional maritime security and providing the necessary 
transparency and dialogue are currently lacking. The Western Pacific Naval Symposium and 
IONS are useful forums, but they are navy-centric and unlikely to take any initiative that 
might lead to critical scrutiny of naval budgets, objectives or operations. The ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF) has made a start by establishing an Inter-Sessional Meeting (ISM) on 
maritime security, but this forum may be similarly restrained and suffer from the same 
limitations that have inhibited its parent forum.43 
 
There is an evident need for increased regional thinking and research on relevant issues. 
Increased regional expenditure on defence should be of serious concern. It has a high 
opportunity cost, particularly for poorer countries, in terms of diverting resources from 
important programmes for economic development, social improvement and poverty 
alleviation. There is also the notion that increased defence spending in the region is driven at 
least in part by the supply side with American, European, and Russian defence firms 
aggressively seeking new customers following the drying up of their domestic markets.44 
 
Increased defence spending creates an environment of increased military activity that is 
potentially destabilising with greater numbers of aircraft, warships, submarines and armoured 
vehicles. The situation in the maritime environment is of particular concern with more ships, 
submarines and maritime aircraft operating in relatively confined regional waters some areas 
of which include sovereignty disputes and unresolved maritime boundaries. Increased 
military activity at sea increases the risks of an unfortunate incident between naval forces. 
More effective arrangements to reduce these risks are a pressing requirement, including water 
space management and prevention of mutual interference agreements that recognise the risks 
associated with submarine proliferation in the region.45 
 
The establishment of an Asian Peace Research Institute (APRI) might be considered. This 
would be an independent institution with close links to relevant international agencies such as 
the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and the Stockholm International Peace 
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Research (SIPRI).  The 2008 annual report from SIPRI includes a strong call to arms control 
predicting that the next two years will see a broadening consensus around the world that more 
serious and effective arms control and disarmament measures are required.46 As we move 
further into the Asian century, it is essential that Asia participate in this dialogue. An APRI 
would help develop regional views on key issues, including transparency, preventive 
diplomacy in potential areas of conflict, and particular confidence and security and building 
measures. Maritime-related measures would be high on its agenda. 
 
Conclusion 
It is difficult to escape from a pessimistic conclusion to this collection of papers. Desirable 
levels of trust and understanding between the rising maritime powers of Asia, not just China 
and India but also Japan, Korea and Russia, are currently lacking, and present frameworks 
appear inadequate for developing these qualities. A huge geopolitical change is impending 
with the rise of China and India, and the implications may not have been fully appreciated as 
yet. This trend begs for more attention than it is receiving at present, but present institutions 
and frameworks do not appear up to this task. 
 
National and international interests in maritime security in Southeast Asia are both diverse 
and potentially divergent both within the region and between regional countries and the major 
players outside the region. Several chapters in this work show how finding common interests 
to promote cooperation will be very difficult. While there are divergent interests, there are 
real risks of competitive maritime strategies emerging and potentially fuelling naval arms 
races. 
 
Competition and rivalry between China and India seems likely to continue as sources of 
instability and insecurity in the region. Inevitably by virtue of geography, Southeast Asia is 
enmeshed in this dilemma as the spheres of influence of the rising naval powers largely 
overlap within its geographical limits. The mitigation of the risks requires more attention to 
preventive diplomacy and maritime confidence and security building measures, including 
greater transparency with regard to naval operations and exercises. 
 
The Asia-Pacific maritime scene is very active at present. Naval activity levels are high and 
naval budgets continue to grow with many regional navies moving into more advanced 
capabilities and larger warships than they operated previously. The dynamic nature of the 
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regional maritime security environment has been demonstrated in 2009 by the rapid 
improvement in cross-Strait relations and by the deterioration of the situation with North Korea.  
 
The waters of Southeast Asia are likely to see increased numbers of surface warships, 
submarines and maritime aircraft in the years ahead. While these developments are largely in 
response to a feeling of increased maritime insecurity, the developments themselves also have 
potential to add to insecurity in the region. This is all part of the well-known security dilemma, 
and regional forums, such as the ARF, will be challenged in the future to address these spiralling 
naval force developments. Furthermore, some of the new capabilities, particularly submarines, 
are not well suited to processes of cooperation and confidence building that might be considered.  
 
Initiatives to restore some optimism in the situation might be taken at two levels. First there are 
the actions that navies might take themselves, including the more active pursuit of confidence 
building measures that might reduce the risks of naval clashes getting out of hand. The objective 
of all parties should be a more stable regional security environment in which countries do not 
feel compelled to continually expand their naval budgets. To the extent that navies engage in 
confidence building, they might be working themselves out of a job! Secondly, at the political 
level, the dangers of the current situation should be given greater attention, but so far realist 
politics and self-interest have prevented this from occurring. Greater transparency is required 
and this might only occur through the work of an independent institute such as that suggested 
above. 
                                                            
1 Asad-ul Iqbal Latif, Between Rising Powers: China, Singapore and India, Singapore: ISEAS, 2007, pp. 239 
and 260. 
2 James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, “China’s Naval Ambitions in the Indian Ocean” The Journal of 
Strategic Studies, Vol. 31, June 2008, pp. 367-394. 
3 Joshua Ho (ed), Between Rising Naval Powers: Implications for Southeast Asia of the Rise of Chinese and 
Indian Naval Power, A Conference Report, Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2009,  p. 
21. 
4 Bill Emmott, Rivals – How the power struggle between China, India and Japan will shape our next decade, 
London: Penguin Books, 2009, p. 3 
5 Walter C. Ladwig II, “Delhi’s Pacific Ambition: Naval Power, ‘Look East,’ and India’s Emerging Influence in 
the Asia-Pacific”, Asian Security, Volume 5, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 87 – 113 
6 The recent Australian Defence White Paper, for example, is ambivalent on this issue. Paul Dibb, “Is the US 
Alliance of Declining Importance to Australia?” Security Challenges, Vol. 5, No. 2, Winter 2009, pp. 37-38. 
7 Bronson Percival, “U.S. Engagement with China, India and Southeast Asia”, Chapter 5 in Sam Bateman and 
Joshua Ho (eds), Between Rising Naval Powers; Southeast Asia and the Rise of Chinese and Indian Naval Power, 
London: Routledge, 2009, p.  
8 Sam Bateman, “Clashes at Sea: When Chinese vessels harass US Ships”, RSIS Commentaries, 27/2009, 13 
March 2009. 
9 David Carter and Erik Slavin, “USS McCain arrives at Sasebo after suffering damage to sonar array”, Stars 





10 Evelyn Goh, ‘Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia – Analyzing Regional Security 
Strategies’, International Security, Vol. 32, No. 3, Winter 2007, pp 114 and 117. 
11 Ibid., p. 121 
12 John J. Tkacik Jr., “The Taiwan Conundrum: Maritime Security Capacity Building in East Asia Before a 
Taiwan Strait Settlement”, Paper presented at Maritime Capacity Building Conference, at Mississippi State 
University, 16-17 June 2009, organised by Centre for International and Security Studies, Mississippi State 
University, p. 1 
13 Rajeev Sawhney,“Redefining the Limits of the Straits: A Composite Malacca Straits Security System”  
RSIS Commentary 37/2006, Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 18 May 2006. 
14 Comments by RADM Ravi Vohra IN (Rtd),  Ho, Between Rising Maritime Powers,  p. 7. 
15 Matt Wade, “Asian giants drawn into energy row”, The Sydney Morning Herald, 15-16 November 2008, p. 
20. 
16 Ian Storey, “China, the Impeccable Affair and Renewed Rivalry in the South China Sea,  The Asia-Pacific 
Journal, Vol. 22-5-09, June 1, 2009 (http://japanfocu.org/-Ian-Storey/3162) (accessed 6 June 2009) 
17 Leszek Buszynski and Iskandar Sazlan, “Maritime Claims and Energy Cooperation in the South China Sea”, 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2007, pp. 143-171. 
18 Rory Medcalf, “The Australian Navy in the Asian Century: Setting a New Course”, Chapter 17 in Bateman 
and Joshua Ho (eds), Between Rising Naval Powers, p. 
19 Comments by Tetsuo Kotani as noted in Ho, Between Rising Naval Powers, p. 20.   
20 D.S. Rajan, “Beijing: Suspicions on Japan-India Security Declaration targeting China”, Paper No. 2912, 
South Asia Analysis Group, 3 November 2008 
(http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers30%5Cpaper2912.html) (accessed 5 July 2009)   
21 Mike McDevitt, “U.S. Perspective”, Chapter 15 in Sam Bateman and Joshua Ho (eds), Between Rising Naval 
Powers, p. 
22 Australian Government (2009), Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific Century: Force 2030, Defence White 
Paper, Canberra: Department of Defence, p.33. 
23 Defence White Paper, p. 22.  
24 Ibid., p. 22. 
25 Kwa Chong Guan, ‘Cooperation and Confidence Building: A Southeast Asian Perspective’, chapter 18 in 
Bateman and Ho, Between Rising Naval Powers, p.  
26 Norman Friedman, “Shaping Naval Power – Implications of the Naval Buildup in Asia”, Chapter 12 in  Sam 
Bateman and Joshua Ho (eds), Between Rising Naval Powers, p. 
27 Josh Kurlantzick, “Rearming the World”, Boston Globe, 27 April 2008, Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=print&id=20080 (accessed 
16 May 2008). 
28 “China second biggest arms spender in world: SIPRI”, The Times of India, 8 June 2009, 
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/World/China/China-second-biggest-arms-spender-in-world-
SIPRI/articleshow/4631953.cms (accessed 7 July 2009). 
29 Li Minjiang, “Towards a Cooperative Maritime Regime in Southeast Asian Seas – Contemporary Issues, 
including in the South China Sea”, Chapter 19 in Bateman and Ho, Betrween Rising Naval Powers, p. 
30 Richard J. Samuels, “”New Fighting Power!” Japan’s Growing Maritime Capabilities and East Asian 
Security”, International Security, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Winter 2007/08), pp. 84-112. 
31  Sam Bateman, “The Indian Ocean Naval Symposium – Will the Navies of the Indian Ocean Region unite?”  
RSIS Commentaries, No. 35, 17 March 2008. 
32 Friedman, “Shaping Naval Power”, p. 
33 “China Plans New Naval Capabilities”, Xinhua, 16 April 2009, 
http://asiadefence.wordpress.com/2009/04/16/china-plans-new-naval-capabilities/ (accessed 22/06/20090 
34 Richard Bitzinger, “A new arms race? The political economy of maritime military modernization in the Asia-
Pacific”, The Economics of Peace and Security Journal, Vol. 4, No.2, p. 23. 
35 Paul Burnell and Andy Denwood, “Perils of a new Pacific arms race”, BBC News, 14 August 2007, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/pr/fr/-/asia-pacific/6937293.stm (accessed 15 August 2007). 
36 Gurpreet S. Khurana, “China's New Submarine Base at Hainan: Analyses of Recent Media Reports” 
Strategic Analysis, Volume 32, Issue 5, 2008, Pages 713 – 719 
37 Park Chang Kwoun, “The Korea Perspective”, Chapter 8 in Bateman and Ho, Between Rising Naval Powers, 
p.    
38 Ibid., p.   
39 Nicholas Yong, “Calls for transparency in security”, The Straits Times, 1 June 2009, p. 1. 
40 Vice Admiral Pradeep Chauhan IN, “Scope for Maritime Cooperation and Confidence Building”, Chapter 18 




41 Admiral Arun Prakash, “Introduction” to Bateman and Ho, Between Rising Naval Powers, p.   
42 C. Raja Mohan, “Between Rising Powers – A Broad Strategic Overview”, Chapter 1 in Bateman and Ho, 
Between Rising Naval Powers, p. 
43 The first meeting of this group was held in Surabaya, Indonesia, in March 2009. 
44 Bitzinger, “A new arms race?”, p. 26. 
45 Sam Bateman, “Perils of the Deep: The Dangers of Submarine Operations in Asia”, RSIS Commentaries 
12/2007, 21 February 2007. 
46 Bates Gill, “Introduction. A call to arms control”, SIPRI Yearbook 2008, 
http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2008/00 
